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“Art is our supreme clue to morals” 
- Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics 
 
 
INTRODUCTION* 
 
Throughout her work, Iris Murdoch often touches on the intersection between ethics 
and aesthetics, in particular focussing on art’s role in moral perception. As a novelist and 
philosopher, Murdoch asks, “What is a good man like? How can we make ourselves morally 
better?”1 While she looks to aesthetics to address each of these questions, the literature to date 
has overwhelmingly focussed on the latter. Murdoch does not limit herself to the question of 
whether art can make us “morally better”. She also asks how art can help us understand what it 
is to be moral. 
The literature on Murdoch concerned exclusively with the intersection of aesthetics and 
ethics is limited. Moreover, within this literature, there is little debate about the role that art plays 
in moral perception. The dominant reading is that art is a vehicle through which we can achieve 
moral perception. On this view, critics including Anil Gomes and Elizabeth Burns argue that art, 
under certain conditions, can serve a practical purpose by allowing us to perceive of its subject 
matter morally. Therefore, looking at art can in some circumstances allow us to actually 
experience moral perception. Discussions here have in particular tended towards Murdoch’s role 
in “philosophy’s turn to literature”.2 While I do not dispute that this is a legitimate reading of 
Murdoch’s aesthetics, my concern is that it is not exhaustive. Rather, Murdoch’s account of the 
role of art in moral perception is more complex. Murdoch also argues that art plays a useful 
explanatory role insofar as aesthetic and moral perceptions are analogous. That is, in identifying 
the similarities between aesthetic and moral perception, we can come to a better understanding 
of what moral perception is.  
A more detailed discussion of Murdoch’s account of moral perception and art will 
follow, but for the sake of clarity, I will begin with some basic definitions. I intend the notion of 
art to be read broadly as referring to any medium, including sculpture, painting, poetry, literature, 
																																																								
* I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Moira Gatens, for her support and guidance throughout my Honours year, 
and in writing this thesis. Thanks also to Tom Davidson McLeod, Kryssa Karavalos, and Laura Parmegiani for their 
1 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge, 2014), 51. 
2 Floora Ruokonen, “Iris Murdoch and the Extraordinary Ambiguity of Art,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (2008): 
77. 
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music, and theatre. Again, for clarity, I will adopt Murdoch’s term for the audience or viewer of 
an artwork: the “client”.3  
In order to deepen our understanding of Murdoch on the role of art in moral perception 
I will first outline her view of moral perception generally, before turning to the role that art plays. 
As such, this thesis will take three parts. First, I will articulate Murdoch’s account of moral 
perception. I will not attempt to defend it in opposition to other theories of morality. My interest 
is not in whether or not we ought to accept her account of moral perception, rather, assuming 
for the sake of argument that we can accept it, I then ask what role art is playing in that account. 
In Chapter Two, I will outline how Murdoch’s aesthetics have been interpreted to date, drawing 
attention to the focus on “great”4 art, in particular literature. In Chapter Three, I will adopt a 
reading of Murdoch, which allows that aesthetics and ethics do not only intersect where art 
occasions moral perception. Here I will discuss the peculiarities of aesthetic vision: what it means 
to see something as an artwork. I argue that aesthetic vision is usefully analogous to moral vision. 
The conclusion then is that by reflecting on the nature of aesthetic vision, we can work towards 
a richer conceptual understanding of moral perception. 
If we are to do credit to the complexity of Murdoch’s aesthetics, we need to understand 
the role of art as multifaceted. Murdoch holds that art is both practically morally edifying, insofar 
as it is a vehicle for moral perception, and conceptually useful for helping us think about what 
moral perception is. In arguing that art can actually help us achieve moral perception, Murdoch is 
asking too much of art. However, I will defend her additional claim that art can improve our 
conceptual understanding of moral perception. These two interpretations of the role of art in 
moral perception are not mutually exclusive. As such, in defending art’s explanatory role, I am 
not rejecting existing interpretations. However, I will argue that the claim about art as an 
explanatory analogy is more defensible, albeit less bold, and therefore should not be overlooked. 
Thus this thesis will attempt to address the overemphasis on art as a vehicle for moral perception 
by shedding light on its explanatory role. In so doing I hope to work towards a more complex 
conception, not only of the intersection between ethics and aesthetics in Murdoch, but also of 
her account of moral perception itself.  
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
3 Iris Murdoch, “Art is the Imitation of Nature,” in Existentialists and Mystics, ed. Peter Conradi (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1997), 246.  
4 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 83. 
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CHAPTER I: MORAL PERCEPTION 
A reassessment of Murdoch’s account of the role of art in moral perception needs to be 
situated in a broader understanding of what moral perception is, and its moral significance. Later 
in this thesis, I will outline readings of Murdoch that suggest that looking at great art is an 
experience of moral perception. I will also discuss how aesthetic vision is analogous with moral 
vision, such that identifying key features of the way we look at art can help us better understand 
what it means to perceive something morally. If either of these claims is to bear any moral 
weight, we need to first ask whether moral perception is a tool, which can be utilised to achieve 
moral action, or whether moral perception constitutes a kind of moral action in itself. When we 
perceive art morally, are we sharpening our moral tools, or is the moral perception of the 
artwork in itself a moral achievement? In this chapter, I will defend the latter. Therefore, we can 
understand the following discussion of art’s role in moral perception in terms of art’s broader 
moral significance: wherever art occasions moral perception, or improves our moral perceptual 
capabilities, it constitutes a moral achievement.  
In contrast to consequentialist and deontological views of morality, a moral perceptual 
view argues that an agent’s morality is not defined by their adherence to moral rules, or by the 
consequences of their actions. Rather, “one’s moral understanding is directly reflected in what 
one sees”.5 In this chapter, I will outline the various roles of moral perception in motivating 
moral behaviour, and will defend that moral perception can, in some cases, constitute moral 
behaviour. My aim here is not to ‘take a side’ in the historical debate against deontological and 
consequentialist views of morality, because I do not attempt to argue for a theory of morality as 
constituted entirely in moral perceptual capacities. Instead I support the suggestion that moral 
perception is a facet of morality, such that a relevant factor in an agent’s ability to behave morally 
is that she can see the morally salient features in a situation. This does not preclude the moral 
relevance of, for example, her principles, or the consequences of her actions. This approach 
allows for a multifaceted view of moral character as constituted in an agent’s inner life6 (beliefs, 
values, perceptions), as well as their actions and the consequences of those actions. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
5 Bridget Clarke, “The Lens of Character: Aristotle, Murdoch and the Idea of Moral Perception,” (PhD diss, 
University of Pittsburgh, 2003) 70. 
6 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 9. 
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I.1. Murdoch’s Account of Moral Perception 
 
Murdoch suggests that to see morally salient features is to see past the ego or the self. 
She states, “the enemy of moral life is the fat relentless ego”.7 If we take the “ego” here to be 
referring to self-interest or natural egoism, the argument is that our experience of a reality 
outside ourselves is almost always distorted and obscured by self-interest. As such, we do not 
often experience reality, rather a “selfish dream life”,8 by which “the mind is besieged”.9 The task 
of moral perception, therefore, is to overcome the ego, and see the world as it is. Murdoch’s 
concept of a transcendent Good10 refers to this reality outside of ourselves, which is so often 
obscured by the ego. As such, seeing the world as it is equates to seeing the Good. 
Given Murdoch’s intensely sceptical view that human experience is removed from reality, 
it is immensely difficult (if not impossible) to ever achieve a total, accurate vision of reality, 
entirely unobscured by the ego. I will, therefore, adopt Bridget Clarke’s useful distinction 
between two ways of envisioning reality as described by Murdoch. There is “total vision”;11 the 
near unattainable “view of reality as a whole; it is the frame for the picture”,12 and then 
“individual vision”,13 which is “one’s grasp of particular individuals within the outlook; it is the 
moment-to-moment picture within the frame”.14 Individual vision includes contemplation of any 
“part” of reality, “from twists of paper and blades of grass to foreign languages”.15 Murdoch 
suggests that other humans in particular are the most interesting objects of moral perception, 
being “far more complicated and enigmatic and ambiguous”16 than other objects of moral 
concern, such as “languages or mathematical concepts”.17 I will return to Clarke’s analogy of 
reality as a framed picture in more detail in the later discussion of the role of art as an analogy to 
moral perception, but for now it is useful for representing how moral perception can be 
achieved. Murdoch notes that total vision is not possible, because the world is “filled with more 
variety and particularity than we can ever fully comprehend”.18 Therefore, the pursuit of total 
																																																								
7 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 51. 
8 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New York: Penguin Press, 1992), 317. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 91. 
11 Clarke, “The Lens of Character: Aristotle, Murdoch and the Idea of Moral Perception,” 71. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Clarke, “The Lens of Character: Aristotle, Murdoch and the Idea of Moral Perception,” 71. 
15 Ibid, 72.  
16 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 89. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, 97. 
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moral vision is constituted in attention to individual details and particulars (especially other 
people),19 rather than abstract contemplation of what the total might look like. 
Murdoch suggests that moral perception is achieved through a “loving gaze”. She 
identifies two key features of a loving gaze; detachment20 and imagination.21 I will return to a 
more detailed discussion of what constitutes imagination and detachment in my subsequent 
discussion of the role of art, but will define them briefly here. Detachment refers to detachment 
from the ego, and is achieved when we perceive something with attention to its particularity and 
individual detail in a concerted effort to understand it for its own sake. Detachment, therefore, 
characterises the selflessness required to achieve moral perception. 
In contrast, imagination refers to a reapplication of language as we attempt to understand 
what we see. This feature acknowledges that a detached gaze should not equate to one from 
which the self is entirely absent, rather one where the self does not dominate or obscure vision, by 
appropriating what it sees to its own interests. Regardless of whatever detachment is achieved, 
our moral concepts are still irreducibly our own.22 Imagination, therefore “brings out what we 
could call the engaged or constructive aspect of attention as opposed to its detached aspect”.23  
In my subsequent discussion of the role of art in engaging a loving gaze, I will return to and 
further clarify both detachment and imagination. 
Murdoch characterises moral perception as a just and loving gaze applied to individual 
particulars, especially other people.24  
 
I.2. Moral Perception as a Means to an End 
 
Moral perception can usefully regulate the application of moral principles. Lawrence 
Blum distinguishes moral perception and moral judgment on the basis that moral judgment 
allows for deliberation regarding how moral principles should be applied in a given situation, 
whereas moral perception allows the agent to recognise that moral principles need to be applied 																																																								
19 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 89. 
20 Ibid, 64. 
21 Ibid, 42. 
22 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 22. 
23 Clarke, “The Lens of Character: Aristotle, Murdoch and the Idea of Moral Perception,” 81. 
24 While I acknowledge that this characterisation of moral perception is contentious, a robust defence of it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. In later sections of this Chapter, I work through criticisms of Murdoch’s account of a loving 
gaze as “detached” and “imaginative”. Although I attempt to clarify her account of a loving gaze, I will not defend it 
against critics who question its practical role, as well as its opposition to existentialism. See Setiya for the challenge 
that Murdoch’s account of moral perception is “quixotic” (Kieran Setiya, “Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good,” 
Philosopher’s Imprint 13, no. 9 (May, 2013): 19.), and see Moran for a criticism of Murdoch’s attempts to reject 
existentialism (Richard Moran, “Iris Murdoch and Existentialism,” In Iris Murdoch, Philosopher, edited by Justin 
Broackes, 181-196. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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in the first place.25 In this sense, moral perception can motivate our application of moral 
principles. Blum illustrates this point with the example of two people seated on a train, who both 
see an exhausted-looking woman standing, holding several shopping bags.26 Joan perceives the 
woman’s discomfort, and in the pursuit of minimising that discomfort (which we can take to be 
a morally ‘good’ act), she offers the woman her seat. John does not recognise the discomfort. 
This is not to say that John has poor moral judgment, that he holds different principles to Joan, 
because we can suppose that if his attention were drawn to the woman’s discomfort, he would 
vacate his seat immediately in a similar attempt to minimise her discomfort. The relevant 
distinction between the two is that Joan sees the discomfort, and so it is only Joan who has a 
reason to stand in the first place. It is, therefore, seeing the morally salient features of a situation 
that provides a reason to act, and moral perception can motivate moral conduct. 
The second, stronger claim about moral perception as a means to a moral end, is that it 
does not motivate the application of moral principles, but that the perception of morally salient 
features creates moral principles. Perceiving morally is not just a process of recognising that a 
principle needs to be applied, but of actually generating a principle. Murdoch supports this view 
by arguing that “the necessity of being moved by moral reasons lies not in the nature of the will 
but in the motivational import of cognition”.27 The claim is that we could not perceive a 
situation morally, and know that it therefore required action, but still be lacking the moral 
principle to apply. To return to the example on the train, where the relevant moral principle is 
that minimising discomfort is morally good, the argument is that Joan could not have morally 
perceived the woman’s discomfort, and been at a loss as to whether or not she ought to have 
minimised it. Seeing the morally salient feature includes seeing the moral principle at stake: “Joan 
saliently perceives… the woman’s good (i.e., her comfort) as at stake in a way that John does 
not. Joan perceives a morally relevant value at stake, while John does not.”28 Again, to distinguish 
moral perception from moral judgment, moral perception is not just the recognition that a moral 
principle needs to be applied, but an understanding of what the principle is. A failure of moral 
perception is then a “failure to see what a circumstance means, in the loaded sense [which entails 
motivation]”.29 To perceive morally is not to recognise that a situation has arisen where a moral 
principle needs to be applied, and to then select from a range of potentially relevant principles. 
Rather, it is to simultaneously recognise the relevant principle and the necessity of its application. 
																																																								
25 Lawrence Blum, “Moral Perception and Particularity,” Ethics 101 no. 4 (July, 1991): 701-702. 
26 Blum, “Moral Perception and Particularity,” 702. 
27 Setiya, “Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good,” 6. 
28 Blum, “Moral Perception and Particularity,” 703. 
29 Setiya, “Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good,” 8. 
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Perceiving the morally salient features includes seeing how to respond, and being motivated 
towards that response.30 
 
I.3. Moral Perception as an End in Itself 
 
The claim that moral perception constitutes moral behaviour is contingent on the idea that 
perceiving morally is morally significant irrespective of the actions, which that perception 
motivates. There are two possible constitutive claims to be made here. The weak claim is that 
“states of mind carry some weight”,31 but perhaps less than actions. This claim allows for the idea 
that performing a morally good action because you perceived the situation morally is better than 
performing the same action for different reasons. The strong claim is that states of mind play a 
“crucial role”32 in determining someone’s moral worthiness. 
I will not attempt to defend the strong claim, rather argue that states of mind do carry 
some weight. Murdoch’s example of the mother-in-law who makes an effort to perceive her 
daughter-in-law as she really is33 provides an example to illustrate this case. Murdoch supposes 
that a mother-in-law, who behaves “beautifully”34 towards her daughter in law, nonetheless 
privately views her as “a silly vulgar girl”.35 After some internal effort, she comes to see her more 
accurately as (amongst other things) “not vulgar but refreshingly simple… and so on”.36 I will 
return to this example in more detail later, when I sketch Murdoch’s characterisation of what 
achieving moral perception involves. The argument is nonetheless clear, that the mother-in-law 
is a better moral agent after her efforts to perceive the daughter-in-law morally, than she was 
previously, despite her behaviour having remained constant. 
Blum’s example of Joan and John on the train is again useful to illustrate this point. Even 
if John was prompted to act, and acted perfectly by giving up his seat immediately and without 
any resentment,37 or even let’s say if he gives up his seat any time he sees someone standing with 
bags (irrespective of apparent age or discomfort), owing to a habitual attention to rules, he is still 
morally distinct from Joan. Unlike Joan, he still displays a “deficiency” in the form of “a 
situational self-absorption or attentional laziness”.38 While this deficiency is mitigated by his 																																																								
30 Blum, “Moral Perception and Particularity,” 712. 
31 Christopher Mole, “Attention, Self, and The Sovereignty of Good,” in Iris Murdoch: A Reassessment ed. Anne Rowe 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 73. 
32 Ibid, 74. 
33 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 16. 
34 Ibid, 17. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Blum, “Moral Perception and Particularity,” 704. 
38 Blum, “Moral Perception and Particularity,” 704. 
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standing to help the woman, such that his action makes him better, he is not Joan’s moral equal by 
virtue of the action alone. Therefore, “The moral importance of states of mind is not exhausted 
by the importance of their effects”.39 That is, our moral perceptions are significant in and of 
themselves, not just in virtue of the actions that they motivate. 
 
I.4 Problems with Murdoch’s Account 
 
Murdoch’s characterisation of moral perception as a loving gaze opens her account up to 
criticisms, both about her use of the term love, and about where her theory is situated in relation 
to the views of morality, which she takes herself to be opposing. It seems contradictory for 
Murdoch to assert that the gaze required for moral perception can be at once loving and 
detached, given the intuitive implication that love is impassioned. In order to resolve this 
potential problem, we need a clarification of what she means by love. Further, we need to clarify 
detached, and in particular distinguish it from rational. Murdoch sets herself up in opposition to 
traditional rationalist views of morality, 40  offering a loving gaze as an alternate to the 
consequentialist and deontological views that centre on a rational agent’s decision-making. As 
Mark Hopwood notes, “Murdoch explicitly and repeatedly contrasts the vision that is occasioned 
by reason and the vision that is occasioned by love.”41 If we cannot, therefore, understand 
detached in terms other than unemotional or rational, then Murdoch’s insistence that moral 
perception features detachment risks undermining her starting point. In an attempt to resolve 
these potential criticisms of her characterisation of a loving gaze, I will address both love and 
detachment in turn. 
 
I.4.1 A Loving Gaze 
 
In order to clarify what Murdoch means by loving, I will adopt Hopwood’s 
characterisation of love as eros in Murdoch’s account. Hopwood defines eros as a form of desire 
with the following necessary conditions; that the desire be directed at a particular object whose 
value cannot be captured under a closed description,42 that it engage the imagination,43 and that it 
																																																								
39 Mole, “Attention, Self, and The Sovereignty of Good,” 73. 
40 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 99. 
41 Mark Hopwood, ““The Extremely Difficult Realisation that Something Other Than Oneself is Real”: Iris 
Murdoch on Love and Moral Agency,” European Journal of Philosophy (July, 2017), 3. 
42 Ibid, 17. 
43 Hopwood, ““The Extremely Difficult Realisation that Something Other Than Oneself is Real”: Iris Murdoch on 
Love and Moral Agency,” 17. 
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carry with it a normative demand.44 That the object not be under closed description requires that 
there be no finite list of features rendering the object desirable. To use Hopwood’s example, if 
Juliet feels eros towards Romeo, then she might be able to list attributes of his that she likes. 
However, we cannot assume that she would feel equally towards another person bearing all of the 
same features. That is, “it is understood that the description does not capture the value of the 
object in the way that a closed description does.”45 One of the ways that we can distinguish the 
love to which Murdoch is referring from other kinds of passion is by the condition that it not be 
under closed description. That is, that our desire is not based on a finite list of desirable qualities. 
We might still desire the object if some of its qualities changed, or conversely, we might not 
desire another object with the same features equally.  
The link between eros and the imagination is in the attempt to convey a sense of eros to a 
third party. Hopwood suggests that if we feel eros towards an object, for example a painting, and 
we were attempting to convey our passion to a third party, we might change our description of 
the painting depending on whom we were talking to in an attempt to inspire an equal passion: 
“One day, I go along to an exhibition with an old friend, and as we stand in front of one 
of the Turner paintings on display, she begins to talk about her response to the work. 
She talks about the elegance of the composition and the subtlety of the color, but she 
also talks about how it makes her feel – about how it reminds her of summer days when 
the two of us used to play in the rain together as children. As we stand there talking 
about the picture, I begin to see it differently.”46 
The suggestion here is that it takes an imaginative effort to convey eros, and that through 
imaginative stimulation of the hearer, that eros can be shared. 
Finally, eros conveys a normative demand. To say that you love something in this way is 
to imply that it warrants that judgment; although a subjective statement, a claim of eros also 
makes an objective evaluation. As Hopwood suggests, to feel eros towards “a piece of music,”47 
for example, is “for it to merit the pleasure that I take in it”.48 It is this objective evaluation that is 
a condition of eros, which distinguishes it from other types of desire, such as preference. To say 
that I prefer one piece of music to another, is to make a subjective claim. However, if I feel eros 
towards one piece of music, then I am making a claim to it being objectively superior: it is not 
just that I like it more, but also that it is better. We can recognise this objective condition if we 																																																								
44 Hopwood, ““The Extremely Difficult Realisation that Something Other Than Oneself is Real”: Iris Murdoch on 
Love and Moral Agency,” 17. 
45 Ibid, 15. 
46 Ibid, 20-21. 
47 Ibid, 16. 
48 Ibid. 
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think of the familiar response to disagreement with our expressions of eros. Regarding the Turner 
painting in the example above, if I felt eros towards the painting, I would be outraged or shocked 
to find that someone else did not agree, in a way that would not seem justified had I just said 
that I liked it, or that I preferred it to another painting in the gallery. If eros were an exclusively 
subjective assessment, there would be no cause for shock or outrage in discovering that it is not 
shared by everyone. Therefore, eros requires a normative claim, unlike other types of desire.  
Taking Hopwood’s conception of eros, we now need to understand its application to 
morality. The question is: How can we look at something morally in a way that displays eros? 
Hopwood suggests that to have moral eros is to love another person or thing in such a way that it 
is not under closed description; it is to accept their infinite complexity. Here we see how eros 
corresponds with Murdoch’s account of what it is to view another morally: “recognizing the 
existence of other people means not only recognising them as similar to ourselves, but also as 
indefinitely particular, obscure, and alien”.49 Hopwood asserts that such a recognition does 
indeed require both a normative respect for the individuality and “otherness” of the subject, as 
well as imaginative engagement: “To say that this realisation is ‘extremely difficult’ is to say that 
this value is one that cannot be brought under a closed description, but requires an effort of 
imaginative engagement directed at something existing beyond what I am currently capable of 
seeing.”50 Therefore, Hopwood’s reading of Murdoch’s “loving gaze” as a moral eros allows us to 
understand love as more complex than an initial reading might suggest. 
Taking love to refer to eros as characterised by Hopwood, we can now understand detached, 
as referring to the selfless respect for the subject of one’s desire as entirely distinct and other, 
rather than as emotionless. Murdoch’s account of a loving gaze, therefore, is distinct from 
rationalist accounts of morality to the extent that it does rely on an emotion (eros), rather than on 
strictly rational decision-making. 
 
I.4.2. Overcoming the Ego 
 
Arguably a more pressing problem with Murdoch’s account of what moral vision 
involves is the seeming contradiction of insisting both that the ego be transcended, and that the 
inner life be given close attention. Murdoch makes the following seemingly contradictory claims; 
that the ego is the “enemy” of moral life,51 and that “trying to become good involves giving 																																																								
49 Ruokonen, “Iris Murdoch and the Extraordinary Ambiguity of Art,”: 83. 
50 Hopwood, ““The Extremely Difficult Realisation that Something Other Than Oneself is Real”: Iris Murdoch on 
Love and Moral Agency,” 27. 
51 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 57. 
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attention to things of moral importance”.52 Given that states of mind, and one’s attainment of 
moral perception play an important moral role (as outlined previously), it follows that our inner 
life is morally significant. If we accept Murdoch’s claim that states of mind, are morally 
significant, then we must necessarily attend to them as morally salient features. This would seem 
to result in a self-directed attention that would render overcoming the ego impossible. The 
solution is to “reject the idea that the morally important states of mind and character are inner 
states, and think of them instead as being world-involving”.53 States of mind refer to modes of 
engaging with the world. When we insist that moral perception is morally significant, it is not 
exclusively to the mind of the agent that we are directing attention, but to the relation between the 
agent and the world outside of them; the extent to which they mediate that world through a self-
interested, or through a loving gaze. Murdoch highlights that states of mind are world-involving, 
by making the following etymological observation about the word attention: “‘Attention’ comes 
from the Old French ad tendere: being stretched out.)”54 The implication, then, is that attending to 
states of mind involves attending to the extent to which they are world-involving; how they 
stretch out to the reality outside of them. 
We can understand Murdoch’s account of moral perception as requiring that we 
overcome or transcend the ego, in order to attend to something outside of ourselves with eros: “a 
just and loving gaze”.55 In the next chapter, I will discuss art’s role in helping us develop a “just 
and loving gaze,”56 and the circumstances in which an artist can render a subject in such a way 
that it can be morally perceived by its audience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																									
52 Mole, “Attention, Self and The Sovereignty of Good,” 72. 
53 Ibid, 73. 
54 Ibid, 82. 
55 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 25. 
56 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER II: ART AS A VEHICLE FOR MORAL PERCEPTION 
 
 While Murdoch’s discussion of the role of art in moral perception is multifaceted, the 
focus in the literature to date has overwhelmingly been on the extent to which art can provide an 
experience of moral perception. That is, the ways in which art is a vehicle through which its clients 
can perceive morally. The main proponents of this view of art as an instance of moral perception 
are Burns and Gomes, the role of art in moral perception being their exclusive focus, but this 
discussion will also extend to critics whose focus is on the intersection of philosophy and 
literature. 
In thinking about art as a vehicle for moral perception, Murdoch limits her discussion to 
“great” or “good” art. For Murdoch, an artwork’s greatness is constituted in the extent to which 
it is a realistic portrayal of its subject matter: “it is realism which makes great art great”.57 
“Realism” here is not restricted to mimesis, because Murdoch allows the possibility that non-
mimetic arts can achieve greatness,58 although I will discuss this possibility in further detail later 
in this chapter. Murdoch’s “realism” is better understood in opposition to fantasy. If the artist 
perceives of her subject morally, by seeing it as it really is, as opposed to as a distortion by the 
ego, then she can achieve “good art, not fantasy”.59 Therefore, in this chapter, I will not use 
“great” and “good” as subjective assessments of the artwork’s aesthetic merit, rather strictly in 
Murdoch’s sense. To say that an artwork is “great” is to indicate that the artist has perceived of 
her subject morally, and conveyed that moral vision to their client. 
Murdoch argues that in the case of great art, the artist’s moral perception of the subject 
matter is duly conveyed to the artwork’s client, such that they too can perceive it morally. The 
most common example is in literature, where characters are rendered with such clarity and 
peculiarity that the reader (or “client”)60 comes to view them with a loving gaze: 
“Consider what we learn from contemplating the characters of Shakespeare or Tolstoy or 
the paintings of Velasquez or Titian. What is learnt here is something about the real 
quality of human nature, when it is envisaged, in the artist’s just and compassionate 
vision, with a clarity which does not belong to the self-centred rush of ordinary life.”61 
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In such circumstances, where the artist has a “just and compassionate vision”62 and the capacity 
to convey it with “clarity”,63 then the client can achieve moral perception while engaging with the 
artwork, because they perceive its subject matter morally.  
 In this chapter, I will detail how art can be understood as an instance of moral 
perception. I will outline how the artist comes to have a moral perception of her subject matter. 
While we can accept that an artist might be capable, with careful and devoted attention, of 
perceiving their subject morally, we need a clearer understanding of the requisite “clarity”64 if we 
are to understand how that perception might be conveyed. As such, I will follow my outline of 
the artist’s moral vision with a discussion of how that vision is acquired by clients of the artwork. 
I will then conclude by detailing the limitations of this account, and suggest that we should not 
commit ourselves to a view of art as occasioning moral perception, until we can better delineate 
the conditions under which it does so. 
 
II.1. Artist’s Vision: A Loving Gaze 
 
 Artists, by setting aside their personal fantasies in pursuit of a realistic vision of their 
subject matter, can achieve moral perception. Burns characterises the artist’s moral perception of 
their subject matter as “an analogue for the way in which we should try to perceive our world”.65 
In the following chapter, I will discuss how artists’ attempt at moral vision is an illuminating 
analogue, regardless of whether or not they actually achieve moral perception. However, the focus 
in discussions of Murdoch to date has overwhelmingly been on instances where artists do achieve 
moral vision. Murdoch supposes that in overcoming personal fantasies, as well as refusing to 
“indulge the fantasy life of his client,”66 the artist exhibits a loving gaze:  
“The great artist sees his objects… in a light of justice and mercy. The direction of his 
attention is, contrary to nature, outward, away from self which reduces all to a false unity, 
towards the great surprising variety of the world, and the ability so to direct attention is 
love.”67 
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Ana Eugen Lita observes that this loving gaze is particularly applicable to literature, when the 
“writer’s sensibility disrupts the natural selfishness of human beings.”68 She further articulates 
this sensibility as defined by the novelist’s “toleran[ce] in his endeavor to display a real 
apprehension of persons whose existence is separate from himself and crucially important and 
interesting to themselves”.69 On this view, representing their subject matter truthfully requires 
that artists overcome their natural egoism, and ensure the work is not a product of their personal 
fantasies. Hence Burns claims that the artist’s moral vision plays a role as an explanatory 
analogue to illuminate the unselfish attention required of moral perception.70 Burns is also 
interested in the way the artist’s moral vision can be shared with the artwork’s clients, such that 
they too can achieve moral perception. It is to this further role of art as a vehicle through which 
not only artists, but also clients, can achieve moral perception that I will now turn.  
 
II.2. Thick Concepts: Interweaving of Ethics & Aesthetics 
 
Murdoch’s claim that clients can acquire the artist’s moral perception through the 
artwork rests on her interweaving of the ethical and aesthetic, and her use of “thick concepts”.71 
Murdoch suggests that the ethical and the aesthetic are linked, such that the beautiful is 
synonymous with the Good.72 A beautiful or “great” artwork, therefore, will display something 
of the Good (the “good” here referring to the morally perceived subject matter). Gomes 
articulates this conceptual link between the beautiful and the Good in terms of “thick 
concepts”.73 Thick concepts are descriptions, which also make a value judgment. The value 
judgment is built into the description, so to describe the thing is necessarily to make a judgment 
about it. Such descriptions are world-involving: “it is the world itself which determines which 
thick concept is appropriate, and in so doing it can fix the evaluative attitude we should hold 
towards it”.74 Gomes uses elegant as an example. Describing something as elegant is both a 
description of what it is like, as well as an endorsement, insofar as we can accept that elegant is 
positive. To describe something as elegant, you must not only recognise that it is elegant, but 
further, recognise what elegance is and its normative weight. “Perceiving elegance requires the 
capacity to recognize things as elegant and this, in turn, requires an understanding of the 																																																								
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evaluative point of view which groups together things as elegant”.75 Thick concepts, therefore, 
can be understood as concepts with a “failure of bifurcation”76 between the descriptive and 
evaluative (or normative) judgments. 
There are two conditions under which thick concepts can be used; if either you “grasp”77 
the concept, or if you “possess”78 it. To “grasp” a thick concept, you need to understand the 
“normative element”:79 “without grasp of this normative component, she will not be able to fix 
the reference of the concept and, in particular, will not be able to continue applying the concept 
to new cases”.80 In contrast, to “possess” a thick concept, one needs to “endorse those values as 
one’s own”.81 Gomes again turns to elegant as an example to distinguish the two. She suggests 
that traditional uses of elegant in literature may have been inherently gendered, such that elegant 
was associated with femininity. Gomes suggests, “A reader of Austen may grasp the concept 
sufficiently to understand her applications while dissenting from the beliefs and values which 
make difficult the instantiation of elegance by men.”82 To possess Austen’s concept of elegance, in 
such a way that it could only be applied to the feminine, would be to endorse the gender norms 
that substantiate such a concept. We can, however, grasp the concept, while rejecting those 
norms, although we will be restricted from using elegant as Austen does. “Without some grasp of 
the concept’s evaluative frame, a subject would not be able to recognize items as displaying 
elegance”.83 As such, without endorsing the values that underpin Austen’s use of elegant, we 
might understand what she means when she describes an object in such a way, without 
independently identifying as elegant everything, which she would. Understanding the normative 
element allows us to grasp a thick concept, while endorsing that element constitutes possession 
of the concept. 
Gomes argues that thick concepts are relevant to Murdoch insofar as she perceives the 
aesthetic and the ethical as interwoven. Beauty, for Murdoch, is a thick concept, the normative 
element of which rests on an understanding of the Good. As Murdoch states, “goodness and 
beauty are not to be contrasted but are largely part of the same structure.”84 Gomes suggests that 
there is evidence of the extent to which aesthetic descriptions are thick concepts, indicating 
moral values, in our everyday use of aesthetic and moral language: 																																																								
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“A painting can be honest, a novel can be brave, and a piece of music may display 
integrity. Correlatively, some of our terms of ethical evaluation have distinct aesthetic 
overtones: people and actions can be fine, pure, rotten, or tarnished.”85 
According to Gomes, this use of language evidences that ethics and aesthetics share a common 
“evaluative framework”.86 “Evaluative framework” here refers to the commonalities between 
multiple evaluative concepts within thick concepts. For example, the religious concepts of 
blasphemy, chastity, and original sin87 all draw on the same evaluative framework, just as elegance, 
delicacy, and wit all draw on the same aesthetic framework. Therefore, we can understand 
Murdoch’s claim that the beautiful and good are “part of the same structure”88 as suggesting that 
the framework of our aesthetic and moral concepts overlap. For Gomes, to say that they overlap 
is not to say that they are coterminous, rather that the values underpinning what is moral and 
what is beautiful are not entirely distinct: “The difference between aesthetic and ethical values is 
one of degree and not kind: aesthetic and ethical values lie on a spectrum”.89 The conclusion 
then is that beauty in an artwork is on the same “spectrum” as the Good.  
If we can accept Murdoch’s claim that the beautiful and the Good are part of the same 
structure, then wherever an artwork is beautiful, it reveals something of the Good. Although I 
will challenge that the beautiful and good are as interwoven as Murdoch asserts, for now I will 
explore the two ways in which a beautiful artwork can contribute to our understanding of the 
Good; that is, two ways in which a beautiful artwork conveys the artist’s moral perception of 
their subject matter. 
 
II.3. Attending to Beauty: Acquiring Artist’s Moral Vision 
 
If we are to accept the claim that beauty and good are “part of the same structure”,90 we 
need to start with a clearer understanding of what Murdoch defines as beauty. Here I will not 
attempt to engage in the vast debate in aesthetics surrounding the definition of beauty, or its 
intersection with truth and good. Rather I will articulate the close relation between beauty, truth 
and the Good on Murdoch’s account, so that we can better understand what she means by 
beauty. Beauty to Murdoch is perhaps most clearly articulated by contrast with “fantasy”.91 
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Murdoch defines ‘bad art’ as “fantasy”,92 where good art is a “vision of reality”.93 She states, “we 
can see in mediocre art, where perhaps it is even more clearly seen than in mediocre conduct, the 
intrusion of fantasy, the assertion of self, the dimming of any reflection of the real world”.94 
Fantasy, therefore, is art, which is not a product of the artist’s moral vision, rather of their 
adherence to their own egoistic illusions, or those of their clients. Conversely, beauty for 
Murdoch is inseparable from truth: beauty constitutes “a truthful image of the human 
condition”.95 Although we need not accept that moral perception on behalf of the artist is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for an artwork to achieve beauty, we can accept that it is 
necessary on Murdoch’s account, such that an artwork would descend into fantasy without it. 
Given the interweaving of ethical and aesthetic concepts, a beautiful artwork will reveal 
to its client the artist’s conception of the Good; their moral perception of the subject matter. 
Murdoch, therefore, suggests that by attending to great or beautiful art, we can learn about that 
which is depicted, because it offers “a juster, clearer, more detailed, more refined understanding 
of human nature, or of the natural world, which crowds upon our senses”.96 By engaging with 
the beauty in great art, we can also learn something about the moral framework with which it 
overlaps, and so acquire the artist’s moral vision. For example, if we take compassion to be a 
thick concept, then in the artist’s compassionate rendering of their characters, we can learn 
something, both about the characters, and the nature of compassion itself. Diamond uses 
Dickens as an example of such an artist:97 
“The attention which we see directed towards the lives and thoughts of children has a 
characteristic emotional colour, the result of its combining great warmth, concentration 
of energy and humour … Where he is successful, the description is not just enjoyable but 
can contribute to our lasting sense of human life, of what is interesting and important.”98 
Murdoch reiterates Diamond’s claim about literature, when she states, “the study of good 
literature, or of any good art, enlarges and refines our understanding of truth”.99 If the artist has 
achieved moral perception in relation to their subject matter, and rendered it beautifully, then 
they allow their clients the opportunity to experience100 that moral vision, and learn from it.  
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II.4. Co-attending to Artwork: Acquiring Co-attender’s Thick Concepts 
 
Gomes attests to a further role of art, even where we cannot share the artist’s moral 
perception. In such instances, perhaps where we cannot recognise an element of the Good in an 
artwork (perhaps we do not find it beautiful, or we miss some potentially appealing aspect of it 
when we initially attend), we can nonetheless develop our conception of the Good, and work 
towards moral perception by co-attending. By co-attending, and attempting to describe to 
another what we see in an artwork, even if we do not acquire moral vision, we can nonetheless 
learn something of our co-attender’s vision, and in so doing develop our understanding of their 
moral concepts. 
The moral framework, or vision of a co-attender can be discovered in the act of co-
attending to an artwork. Murdoch allows that learning about certain thick concepts “takes place 
in the context of particular acts of attention”.101 Gomes suggests that co-attention to art is one 
such act: “joint attention expands our grasp of aesthetic concepts”. 102  Murdoch explicitly 
endorses the moral value of joint attention: “Progress in understanding a scheme of concepts 
often takes place as we listen to normative-descriptive talk in the presence of a common 
object.”103 We can imagine a docent taking a group of school children around an art gallery, and 
that as the art is described to the children, they learn something not only about the works, but 
also about how to look at art more generally. However, mutual influence and understanding can 
arise out of any exercise in joint attention; it need not rest on an imbalance. For example, an art 
critic and novice, or two novices could each learn something of the other’s way of seeing. Joint 
attention allows us to perceive an artwork through our co-attender’s eyes. 
Having accepted Murdoch’s claim about the thickness of ethical and aesthetic concepts, 
the outcome of joint attention is that, by coming to understand another’s vision of an artwork, 
we can adopt their aesthetic vision. To the extent that the aesthetic and ethical are interwoven, 
then acquiring their aesthetic vision also constitutes having a deeper understanding of their 
moral vision. Co-attending offers “partial entry into the evaluative point of view from which 
ethical qualities are identified.”104 Gomes’s claim is not that joint attention is necessary, rather 
that it is “a central part of our standard grasp of these concepts,”105 and consequently about the 
ethical frameworks that underpin their ways of looking. It is worth noting, however, that 
acquiring a deeper understanding of the ethical concepts of our co-attender is not “immediate or 																																																								
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easy”,106 rather “the point is only that entry into another’s aesthetic conceptual scheme makes 
such ethical understanding possible: in coming to understand another’s art, one becomes 
disposed to understand her ethics.”107 Hopwood provides a vivid example of the edifying force 
of joint attention: 
“If you and I are having a discussion of a painting in a gallery, and I think that you are 
not quite appreciating it in the way that it deserves, then I may attempt to come up with 
a description of what is beautiful about it that will help you to engage with it in a 
different way. For example, I might tell you to look at the way the light is dancing, or the 
way in which the depth of the blue almost seems to draw you into the picture. Such 
descriptions are best understood as imaginative attempts to help you to meet the 
normative demand that I take the beauty of the painting to impose, by bringing your 
desires and affective responses into closer correspondence with that beauty.”108 
As such, the claim is not so broad as to suggest that every time we co-attend to an artwork, we 
will acquire our co-attender’s concepts, rather that co-attention gives us the opportunity to do 
so.  
 
II.5. Problems with this Account 
 
 Although Murdoch clearly states that the artist’s vision of their subject matter is a 
“fundamental case of moral seeing”,109 engagement with her aesthetics has not been limited to 
this role. As Burns and Gomes evidence, the focus has been on the extent to which the artist is 
able to convey this moral vision to the client, such that they too can achieve moral perception. The 
interest in art as potentially morally edifying is not at the point where the artist is moral in 
relation to her subject matter, rather in whether art can have an edifying influence on its clients; 
whether it can play a role as a vehicle for moral perception. This account rests on two 
assumptions. The first is that the ethical and aesthetic are interwoven, such that beauty and the 
Good are part of the same structure. The second is that if an artwork is beautiful, its client can 
learn about the Good. I will critique each of these assumptions in turn to challenge Murdoch 
and her supporters in their claim that art is a vehicle for moral perception.  
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II.5.1. Interweaving Ethical and Aesthetic 
 
Murdoch’s central claim that beauty and goodness are thick concepts, such that they are 
“part of the same structure”110 is refutable by counter example. If it were the case that aesthetic 
and ethical concepts were interwoven, then those with a sound understanding of aesthetic 
concepts would arguably be more moral. As Peter Goldie states, “if someone is an honest 
person, we would expect him to be honest in his intellectual or artistic activity as well as in his 
ethical dealings with other people.” 111  However, this conclusion seems at odds with our 
experiences, given that those who have a particular talent for art, or are experienced critics, are 
not overwhelmingly more ethical, or at least do not appear to be obviously so. When we say of 
someone that they “know a lot about art” it is rarely interpreted as a testament to their moral 
character. There appears to be no striking correlation between grasping aesthetic and moral 
concepts, given that “we know perfectly well that good people can be blind to art; and we know 
too that bad or profoundly selfish people can be great artists, or critics of superb judgment and 
taste”.112 Our experience of those with understanding and experience in art is inconsistent with 
the claim that ethical and aesthetic concepts are interwoven. 
Murdoch acknowledges that claims about the thickness of aesthetic and ethical concepts 
are counterintuitive. She allows that, “Good artists can be bad men; the virtue may… reside 
entirely in the work, the just vision be attainable only there.”113 However, while acknowledging 
that beauty and goodness do not intuitively appear related, Murdoch also suggests that they in 
fact are: 
“The good artist is not necessarily wise at home, and the concentration guard can be a 
kindly father. At least this can seem to be so, though I would feel that the artist had at 
least got a starting-point and that on closer inspection the concentration camp guard 
might prove to have his limitations as a father.”114 
What Murdoch is referring to by “got a starting-point”115 is difficult to deduce. Perhaps a defense 
of the thickness of aesthetic and ethical concepts might rest on the conditions under which one 
can “grasp” such concepts. Murdoch might argue that the selfish art critic has only superficially 
“grasped” aesthetic concepts, which would account for an incomplete grasp of ethical concepts. 
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However, without a more rigorous analysis of the conditions of understanding an ethical 
concept, it is difficult to accept that beauty and goodness are as interwoven as Murdoch attests. 
Further, accepting the interweaving of aesthetic and ethical concepts commits us to a 
view of art that is vulnerable to challenges of elitism. If it is the case that beauty and good are 
part of the same structure, such that by engaging with beautiful art we can acquire concepts of 
the Good, then we can equate exposure to art with moral education. The intuitively problematic 
conclusion then arises that those who have not been privileged enough to have an artistic 
education are somehow morally impoverished, or conversely, that those who have had more 
exposure to “great”116 art are morally advantaged.  
 
II.5.2. Beauty in Art 
 
Even if a conception of the thickness of aesthetic and ethical concepts could be 
defended, it is still unclear under what conditions art can display beauty, and by extension, the 
Good. Murdoch identifies a necessary condition for an artwork to be beautiful: that an artist 
perceive of their subject morally. However, it is not clear that this is sufficient. An artist must 
also have the requisite skill to then convey that vision in any given form with “clarity”.117 Clarity 
here refers to the extent to which the artist’s moral vision is made apparent in the artwork; 
whether the artwork’s client can acquire the artist’s vision through the work. There are two 
problems with an account of beauty that relies on the artist’s clarity of representation. The first is 
with the scope and application of “clarity” across many art forms, and the second is with the 
openness of artworks to interpretation. 
 
 II.5.2.a. Beauty in Various Art Forms 
 
Given the vast range of form and subject matter in art, it is difficult to attempt to discern 
whether clarity of representation has been achieved, except on a case-by-case basis. If we 
understand moral perception to be overcoming the ego and seeing the object of one’s attention 
as it is, it is unclear what moral perception in non-mimetic, or non-representational art might 
look like. If it is not immediately obvious to the artwork’s client what is being represented, then it 
is difficult to discern whether the artwork is an instance of fantasy. That is, if we do not know 
what the artist is looking at, how can we speak to whether they have perceived it morally? A 
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minimalist cube, for example, does not have an immediately obvious subject matter. Similarly, it 
is difficult to discern what a symphony is about, and by extension, difficult to identify whether it 
has represented its subject with clarity. Conversely, Murdoch’s emphasis on clarity raises 
questions about the role of mimetic arts, such as photography.118 A possible conclusion from 
reading Murdoch would be that photography, by virtue of the visual accuracy with which it can 
represent its subject, is a paradigmatic case of an artist’s unselfish vision conveyed with clarity. 
Murdoch, however, offers no commentary on photographic arts, so it is a topic that warrants 
further discussion. Murdoch’s emphasis on clarity is perhaps also one reason for the literary 
emphasis in many readings of Murdoch’s aesthetics. A novel has characters, and so the artist’s 
vision of their subject matter includes a moral perception of other people, who Murdoch takes to be 
the most “interesting” 119 object of our attention. If it is the case that art’s ability to occasion 
moral perception can be achieved more broadly than just in representational art, we would need 
to work towards a deeper understanding of the distinction between clarity and fantasy, and its 
application across various art forms. 
Although the preference in discussions of Murdoch has been to focus on literature, as a 
paradigmatic case of clarity of subject matter, Murdoch does allow for the possibility of clarity in 
non-mimetic art forms. Heather Widdows suggests that “There is no use in even attempting to 
apply Murdoch’s ideas to abstract painting or to music, and, wisely, she is silent on these 
topics.” 120  Murdoch certainly favours “representational arts”, 121  which she sees as “more 
evidently hold[ing] the mirror up to nature,”122 however we can see in her discussion of 
“structuralist”123 art that there is scope for her theory to apply more widely. Murdoch takes 
examples where “The object is not ‘pictured’, it is, just as itself, presented: the kettle, the chair, 
the Coca-Cola can, the pile of bricks…”124 Here, given that the object is not “pictured”, 
Murdoch concludes that the work is not about the object, rather about art itself. For example, 
Murdoch understands “a pile of bricks” not as a study of bricks and an attempt to represent 
them truthfully, rather as a meditation on what art is: “The subject matter of art is then the 
nature of the process itself”. 125  We cannot, therefore, read Murdoch’s emphasis on 
representational art as precluding the possibility of non-representational art rendering its subject 
matter with clarity.  																																																								
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Murdoch’s use of exclusively Western art in her examples poses a further problem here. 
The examples of novels and paintings to which Murdoch so readily turns are all canonical works 
in Western art. It is not clear whether there is room in Murdoch’s discussion for different 
cultures’ artistic practices, especially where they are non-mimetic, for example in performance 
art, or body art. If an artwork is non-mimetic, it is more difficult to discern what is being 
represented, and by extension, whether it is represented with clarity. Even allowing that non-
mimetic works, such as structuralist art, can be can be about “the nature of the process itself”126 is 
still limiting, given that Murdoch’s account of “the process” of art speaks exclusively to the 
Western tradition. If we insist on holding onto a view of beauty and goodness as “part of the 
same structure”,127 our account of Murdoch’s aesthetics needs to make room for non-Western art 
practices in an effort to avoid the problematic conclusion that Western art is morally superior. 
Even if we can accept that it is possible on Murdoch’s view for a non-mimetic art to 
achieve clarity, we must query whether her notion of beauty would extend to political art. 
Murdoch expresses a wariness of art as a vehicle for social commentary, and suggests that 
manipulating forms for the purpose of conveying a political message can compromise an 
artwork’s clarity. Art is, therefore, precluded from beauty if it is in service to a political agenda, 
which Murdoch takes to be a kind of fantasy.128 She disputes that artists have a social duty: “the 
artist’s duty is to art, to truth-telling in his own medium, the writer’s duty is to produce the best 
literary work of which he is capable”.129 She does not preclude the possibility that good art can 
also “serve” society, in fact she states that, “the service to society will no doubt appear then also 
as an extra or a by-product.”130 Murdoch here seems to too readily discount the possibility that 
political art might raise awareness or gain support for a morally relevant social issue, despite not 
being beautiful. In fact, some artworks might draw attention to morally relevant issues precisely 
because they are not beautiful, for example, where they shock or repulse their client. While 
Murdoch’s suggestion that beautiful art has the potential to reveal truths to its client is appealing, 
we ought to query whether beauty is necessary. A narrower claim is perhaps preferable; that beauty 
is sufficient to improve the clients’ moral perception of the art’s subject matter, but that there is 
also scope for non-beautiful art to also have a morally edifying influence on its client. Insisting 
that an artwork must be beautiful further narrows the scope of art that meets her criteria for 
greatness, and thereby limits the instances where art can act as a vehicle for moral perception.  
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II.5.2.b. Problem of Interpretation 
 
Accepting that at least some art forms are capable of displaying an artist’s moral vision 
with clarity, there remains a problem regarding whether or not the client will be able to identify 
the moral vision in the work. Murdoch suggests that even art, which is “great”131 and beautiful 
can nonetheless be interpreted as fantasy in the wrong hands: “even great art cannot guarantee 
the quality of its consumer’s consciousness.”132 Murdoch allows, therefore, that art, which 
displays the artist’s moral vision with clarity, will not necessarily do so unequivocally; a concern 
which is reiterated by Burns.133 We can imagine the same novel being perceived differently by 
different readers. The schoolboy might find Lady Chatterley’s Lover more pornographic than the 
literature critic would. In order to discern whether or not an artwork will allow its client to 
perceive the subject matter of the work morally, we need to ascertain not only whether the artist 
has achieved moral vision, and conveyed it with clarity, but also the nature of the client’s 
attention. To this end, further discussion of the most morally edifying way to attend to a work of 
art is warranted, if we are to have a better understanding of art’s role in moral perception. 
Even if we can accept that beauty and goodness are thick concepts, and that they can be 
rendered with clarity across multiple art forms, it is still the case that that clarity might be lost on 
the artwork’s client. As such, even a generous reading of Murdoch on the interweaving of ethical 
and aesthetic concepts still only allows for rare instances of moral perception. Art that occasions 
moral perception requires not only a high standard of quality, but also relies on the attention of 
its client. If this were an exhaustive reading of Murdoch’s aesthetics then we would be left with a 
picture of art as playing a limited role in moral perception, insofar as it offers in rare instances 
moral perception of its subject matter. Although Murdoch does attest that art that occasions 
moral perception is indeed rare, she also speaks to a broader and wider reaching role that art can 
play. It is to this reading that I will turn in the next section, where I argue that even where art 
cannot bring us to actually perceive its subject morally, it can nonetheless play an important 
explanatory role in delineating what moral perception is. 
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CHAPTER III: ART AS ANALOGOUS WITH MORAL PERCEPTION 
 
Murdoch’s discussion of the role of art in moral perception is multifaceted, and does not 
restrict itself to the claim that art is a vehicle through which its clients can achieve moral 
perception. While Murdoch does make the bold claim that art can be edifying to the extent that 
it actually occasions moral perception, she also makes the subtler, less contentious claim that art is 
useful for understanding moral perception. For the reasons outlined in the previous chapter, it is 
only in very rare circumstances that art can achieve the ambitious goal of providing its client with 
an experience of moral perception, and even then the view struggles to defend itself against 
charges of elitism. However, this is not the totality of Murdoch’s account of the role of art in 
moral perception, and in the pursuit of doing full credit to her complexity, we must look to 
additional readings. 
Art can play an important theoretical role insofar as it helps us answer the question: 
What is moral perception like? Given Murdoch’s insistence that moral perception is 
challenging,134 we must assume that instances of it are rare. As such, it is unlikely that we would 
each have vast experience with moral perception in our own life. It is useful, then, to have an 
analogy to turn to, when theorising about the nature of moral perception. If we cannot draw on 
our own experience of moral perception, we can at least learn from more commonplace 
experiences, such as instances of aesthetic vision, insofar as they share the same features. Art, 
therefore, is not only an instance of moral perception, but also an important analogue.  
Aesthetic perception is usefully analogous to moral vision, both in the artist’s struggle to 
render her subject with clarity, and in the client’s loving gaze on the artwork. As previously 
outlined, the literature on Murdoch’s aesthetics mostly concerns great art as a vehicle for moral 
perception. In Burns’s “Five ways from Art to Religion” only one of the five deals with aesthetic 
vision as an analogue, rather than an instance of moral perception.135 Even then it is not where the 
emphasis is placed, nor is it explored in great detail. Discussions of art’s theoretical role in moral 
perception are limited to Marije Altorf, Maria Antonaccio and Ana Lita. Altorf and Antonaccio’s 
focus is on the artist’s vision of their subject matter. Their suggestion is that even where the 
artist does not actually render their subject matter with clarity, their struggle to do so is 
nonetheless analogous to the struggle to morally perceive another person. Contemplating the 
similarities with the artist’s attempt to fit their subject matter to an artistic form thus illuminates 
the challenge of maintaining a loving gaze that is at once imaginative and detached. Lita’s focus 																																																								
134 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 38. 
135 Burns, “Images of Reality: Iris Murdoch’s Five Ways from Art to Religion,” 875. 
	 28	
is not on the artist’s vision of their subject matter, rather on the client’s perception of the 
artwork. She argues that perceiving an artwork requires imagination and detachment. As such, 
aesthetic perception “can be an exercise in moral education: it develops in the subject a capacity 
for looking at things in a certain way – a capacity which has an important analogue in the sphere 
of moral epistemology”.136 This perception is “a fundamental case of moral seeing. The resulting 
close analogy between one paradigmatic case of moral regard and the more common examples 
of such a regard is instructive.”137 In this chapter, I will address both the artist, and client’s 
aesthetic vision in turn; that is, the artist’s vision of their subject, and the client’s vision of the 
artwork. In each case, I will identify similarities between moral and aesthetic vision, and discuss 
how these similarities lead us to a deeper understanding of moral perception. 
 
III.1. Artist’s Vision of Subject Matter 
 
 In the previous chapter, I discussed the artist’s vision of their subject matter at length. 
The argument being that if an artist achieves moral perception of their subject matter, they can 
then convey that vision to the client, such that looking at the artwork offers an experience of 
moral perception. The concern, therefore, was with the extent to which we can acquire an artist’s 
moral perception by looking at their art. Antonaccio’s focus, however, is not on the 
circumstances under which art can provide us with an experience of moral perception. Rather 
her concern is with the way in which the artist’s struggle to convey their vision with clarity is 
analogous with moral perception. As such, art’s role in moral perception is not restricted to 
instances where an artist actually achieves moral vision, and conveys it with clarity. We can also 
learn more about the challenges of moral perception generally, by thinking about the nature of 
artistic vision. 
 The artist’s challenge is to achieve clarity, as opposed to fantasy, in their vision and 
rendering of their subject matter. In the previous chapter, we accepted that it was conceivable 
that an artist could achieve moral perception in relation to their subject matter, and that they 
could come to perceive it with a loving gaze. What Floora Ruokonen identifies is the challenge of 
conveying this gaze using form, given that moral perception of another human requires an 
acceptance of the unknowable138 depth of their particularity. That is, to perceive someone 
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morally is to respect them as infinitely complex, and beyond our total comprehension.139 She 
argues that artworks are incapable of conveying a sense of infinite complexity; they are 
necessarily finite by virtue of their form. A novel necessarily has a beginning, middle and end, a 
painting is confined to the canvas, and even with less conventional art forms, such as 
performance art, there must be a point at which the performance begins and ends. An artwork 
“has got to have form”,140 and as such it is necessarily finite. Therefore, art often tends towards 
fantasy or consolation, insofar as it “changes into a more or less unified whole the contingent 
and formless reality it is supposed to represent”.141 Ruokonen’s concern is that it is only in very 
rare instances that artists can in fact manipulate form to showcase their respect for the infinite 
and unknowable particulars of their subject matter:  
“The vision of an individual offered by literature could be compared to a framed glimpse 
of a huge landscape. The framing might be uniquely revealing and, as such, rewarding. 
However, truthful vision of an individual is also an experience of being lost in boundless 
space.”142 
Form, therefore, conceals a vision of reality as infinitely complex: an experience of “boundless 
space”.143  Thus the challenge for the artist posed by form is that it is paradoxically144 both 
necessary to convey their vision, and instrumental in obscuring it.   
 Antonaccio claims that the challenge of individuals in achieving moral perception mirrors 
this struggle posed by form in art. The analogue here arises from the fact that that 
consciousness, like an artwork, requires form. She suggests that language is the essential formal 
feature by which we think about and perceive the world:145 it mediates our consciousness and our 
moral vision. We naturally apply language egoistically, obscuring our vision of reality, by 
describing it such that it fits our selfish fantasies. As Antonaccio states, “human beings are 
immersed in language and construct unifying narratives to make sense of their lives”. 146 
Antonaccio claims, therefore, that we can undo this obfuscating work of the ego and transcend 
selfish concerns by redescribing what we see: “Given the linguistically mediated nature of 
consciousness, the moral life involves the constant scrutiny of the forms in which consciousness 
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pictures reality to suit its own egoistic purposes.” 147  Murdoch also affirms Antonaccio’s 
suggestion that consciousness is mediated by language:  
“Words constitute the ultimate texture and stuff of our moral being, since they are the 
most refined and delicate and detailed, as well as the most universally used and 
understood, of the symbolisms whereby we express ourselves into existence.”148 
Recalling Murdoch’s famous example of the mother-in-law (M) attempting to perceive of her 
daughter-in-law (D) morally, we can understand her efforts as a redescription. The “texture” of 
her “moral being”149 changed as she acquired a new perception of D as, for example, “fresh” 
rather than “common”.150 This honing of M’s perception can be accounted for “in terms of the 
different descriptive accounts that M gives before and after deliberation”.151 That is to say, that 
the work of moral perception took place as an exercise in the imaginative reapplication of terms. 
For M, “to look again”152 was to describe differently. As such, although Murdoch admits that 
“moral vision is acquired in a social and linguistic context shared with others”,153 she also 
acknowledges that “it is always mediated through the consciousness of an individual and his or 
her unique grasp of language.”154 Clarifying or changing our perceptions is a task of applying and 
reapplying language as we try to counter the fantasy-generating efforts of our natural egoism: 
“language [is] the property of individuals who use it as the instrument of their own moral 
vision.”155 
 Just as artists struggle to achieve clarity using the instruments of their respective medium, 
individuals seeking to perceive others morally will struggle with their instrument: language. Like 
art, consciousness also requires form. Just as form in art moves away from reality towards 
fantasy, language can shape our perception in egoistic ways. Antonaccio identifies this challenge 
of form in art, using the example of literature, where a novel’s challenge is to “maintain the 
tension between the imaginative uses of literary form and the sense of a reality that lies outside 
it”.156 As such, aesthetic and moral visions are “two aspects of a single struggle”.157 If we want to 
better understand the challenge of moral perception, we need only think of an artist facing an 
analogous problem. If we can conceptualise the difficulty for an artist to convey the infinite 																																																								
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complexity of her subject matter, within the necessarily finite restrictions of her form, then we 
can begin to understand the difficulty of reapplying language in a way that moves beyond our 
own egoistic fantasies. 
 Perhaps more importantly, on Antonaccio’s view, art does not only help us characterise 
the struggle of moral perception, but it also helps identify the solution. If the problem of form in 
art is analogous to the “false consolations of linguistic form”158 in consciousness, then the 
solution in art is likely to help us theorise about how to overcome the challenge posed by 
redescription and moral perception. Lita suggests that a key feature of moral perception is the 
confrontation of the “sublime”.159 The “sublime” here is described in opposition to beauty,160 as 
that which evidences that “life is filled with uncertainties and contingencies”. 161 It is important to 
note that while Murdoch takes her concept of the sublime from Kant, hers is nonetheless distinct. 
For Kant, the sublime was a source of pleasure, or “exhilarat[ing]”,162 whereas for Murdoch it is 
not pleasurable, rather sublime “a sharp recognition of the fact that the others are, to a degree 
that we never cease to discover, different from ourselves”. 163  Lita observes that a moral 
perception that was constituted exclusively in the perception of others’ virtues would in fact 
provide a limiting, rather than a realistic view of another person. Rather, “common moral 
intuition tells us that perhaps the most important regard for others is that which we should have 
when they suffer or fail to come up to a supposed standard of virtue”.164 Accepting that other 
people are unpredictable, unreliable, and fundamentally unknowable, and that life is “chancy”165 
is crucial to a clear perception of reality on Murdoch’s view.  
In rare circumstances, great art “proclaims its own incompleteness”166  and thereby 
references the sublime. Murdoch suggests that an example of such incompleteness in art is in a 
failure to adhere to the conventions of genre: “perhaps one of the greatest achievements of all is 
to join [a] sense of absolute mortality not to the tragic but to the comic”.167 John Sturrock cites 
Murdoch’s own novels as examples of this “achievement”: “The comic spirit in her novels is 
what relates her philosophical concerns to real life, comedy being always able to cut elevated 																																																								
158 Antonaccio, A Philosophy to Live By: Engaging Iris Murdoch, 96. 
159 Lita, “Iris Murdoch’s Criticism of Traditional Views of the Moral Self: An Alternate Account of “seeing” the 
Others,” 103. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid, 43. 
162 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 71. 
163 Lita, “Iris Murdoch’s Criticism of Traditional Views of the Moral Self: An Alternate Account of “seeing” the 
Others,” 104. 
164 Ibid, 114. 
165 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 97. 
166 Meszaros, Selfless Love and Human Flourishing in Paul Tillich and Iris Murdoch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), 142. 
167 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 85. 
	 32	
ideas down to size and integrate them with the pettinesses of everyday.”168 Murdoch suggests 
that the sublime in art is “a template for the tragic in life”,169 whose insights risk being 
obfuscated by a more perfect form. The claim is that if we try to make sense of the tragic, to add 
a structure, we end up “monumentalizing [our] own suffering (showing [our]selves as heroes 
against the world)”.170 Accepting the sublime in art demands recognising the incompleteness of 
form. 
Similarly, Antonaccio and characterises the attainment of moral perception as a process 
of taking responsibility for the way linguistic forms limit our consciousness. She states, 
“Murdoch's reflexive understanding of moral perception requires the individual agent to 
resist the false consolations of linguistic form through the very structures of language 
itself. In the same way, the loving perception of others requires the overcoming of 
egoism not through the negation of images or the extinction of the self, but in and 
through the acceptance of oneself as an individual who is responsible for one's relation 
to language.”171 
Therefore, by contemplating aesthetic perception and identifying the features of the sublime in 
art, we can also come to understand the significance of acknowledging the sublime in moral 
perception. Recognising that the form of language inevitably limits our moral perceptual 
capacities is crucial.  Altorf similarly observes, “Moral agents and artists are allowed their inability 
to express the truth or goodness of their work and doings.”172 Just as artists must recognise the 
limits of form to convey the infinite complexity of their subject matter, the work of moral 
perception demands that we recognise the limits of language in our pursuit to understand others.  
 
III.2. Client’s Vision of Art-Object 
 
It is not only the artist’s vision that is analogous to moral perception, but also the client’s 
vision of the artwork. Thinking about the distinctive features of aesthetic viewing; what it means 
to see something as art can help us work towards a better understanding of moral perception, 
insofar as aesthetic and moral perception are analogous. The analogy being drawn here between 
a client looking at an artwork, and individual contemplation of other humans, relies on 
understanding the art-object as analogous with a human: “the art-object is an analogy of the 																																																								
168 John Sturrock, “Reading Iris Murdoch,” Salmagundi 80 (1988): 148 
169 Lita, “Iris Murdoch’s Criticism of Traditional Views of the Moral Self: An Alternate Account of “seeing” the 
Others,” 114. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Antonaccio, A Philosophy to Live By: Engaging Iris Murdoch, 96. 
172 Marije Altorf, Iris Murdoch and the Art of Imagining (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 85 
(my emphasis). 
	 33	
person-object”.173 Murdoch characterises the art-object as a “kind of soul”174 given that it 
necessarily presents itself as a self-contained whole: “insofar as an art object presents itself as a 
unit, it images… the ego-self.”175 In this way, Murdoch develops “understanding of regard for 
others through aesthetic perception”. 176  In this section, I will discuss the key similarities and 
differences between aesthetic and moral perception, and outline the features of moral 
perception, which they each illuminate, including imagination, detachment, and attitudes of 
attention. 
It is important to note at the outset that moral perception has further reach than just the 
perception of other people. In the first chapter there was a lengthy discussion of the perception 
of the morally salient features in a daily situation, using Blum’s example of Joan and John on the 
train. Murdoch, however, emphasises the significance of morally perceiving other people, who she 
characterises as, “far more complicated and enigmatic and ambiguous than anything else we 
might consider an object of moral concern”.177 The focus here is not on a moral perception of a 
situation, rather with a greater challenge; that of applying a loving gaze to another person. The 
features of moral perception identified here are arguably particular to the task of perceiving 
others, such that they could not be applied to other instances of moral perception, such as the 
example from Blum. However, given the significance Murdoch imposes on the moral perception 
of other people, even this very narrow focus warrants attention. 
  
 III.2.1. Aesthetic and Moral Perception as Analogous: Detachment and Imagination 
 
 Looking at an art-object as a client, and perceiving another human, are analogous insofar 
as they both require imagined synthesis on the part of the onlooker. Lita argues that appreciating 
beauty in art requires imagined synthesis of parts into a cohesive whole. She suggests that the 
kind of beauty displayed in art is “a purposiveness of form directed at or oriented toward an idea 
of the goodness of the object apprehended as beautiful”.178 On this account, appreciating the 
beauty of the object is dependent on understanding it as a work of art, for example “the beauty of 
a man or of a building presupposes a concept of the end that defines what the thing has to be 
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and therefore a concept of its perfection”.179 That is, to contemplate a work of art and attempt to 
appreciate it as art is to pay attention to its form, as well as the individual parts of which it is 
comprised. To see a painting is not just to look at an arrangement of colours and lines, but to see 
that arrangement as a painting, or to use Lita’s example; “in the form of a vase, the feeling of its 
beauty, is to be oriented toward the idea of the fulfillment of its purpose as a vase” 180 (emphasis 
added). Or as Murdoch states, “hearing sounds is not hearing a symphony unless we hear it as a 
symphony”.181 To see an art-object as art, therefore, requires an understanding of it as a whole, 
and “involves the idea of a sustained experienced mental synthesis”.182 Understanding an art-object 
as art requires sustained synthesis of its parts in light of an understanding of its form. 
 Morally perceiving other people is analogous to perceiving beauty in art, insofar as it 
demands imagined synthesis. In the case of another person, the form or whole that they 
compromise is that of a person who is capable of evidencing the existence of the Good. To 
return to the example of the mother-in-law, she resolves to see her daughter-in-law in a better 
light,183 and in so doing, begins with the assumption that there is more to see. She starts with an 
assumption of the daughter’s fundamental goodness, and then “M comes to see in her daughter 
D a purposiveness with respect to goods which she identifies by way of the “secondary moral 
terms”.184 By identifying traits in D, which correspond with M’s concept of the Good, she starts 
to work towards a view of D as a good person. This is not to say that there is one form of the 
Good, to which our perceptions of other people must adhere, or as Lita states, “This does not 
mean that one simply learns a rule for recognising the virtues of others… what is important is 
not learning to apply secondary moral terms as a matter of rule, but learning to extend moral 
language to fit ever new cases”.185 Having a concept of an artwork as a painting does not require 
that all paintings be viewed as the same. Rather, it demands that we at once appreciate the 
particularities of the work, and also understand its adherence to a particular form. In the same 
way, understanding another person as good requires that we synthesise our perception of their 
unique traits in light of an understanding of them as Good. Hence, contemplating aesthetic 
perception brings us to a greater understanding of Murdoch’s claim that “The enjoyment of art 
is a training in the love of virtue”.186 We can observe that in the same way that we synthesise the 																																																								
179 Lita, “Iris Murdoch’s Criticism of Traditional Views of the Moral Self: An Alternate Account of “seeing” the 
Others,” 113. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 3. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 17. 
184 Lita, “Iris Murdoch’s Criticism of Traditional Views of the Moral Self: An Alternate Account of “seeing” the 
Others,” 109. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 84. 
	 35	
different formal features of the artwork to picture it as a whole, we synthesise different language 
concepts (formal features) to create a picture of the person as Good.  
It is important to distinguish the claim that perceiving the Good in another person is 
analogous to appreciating beauty, from the discussion regarding thick concepts in the previous 
chapter. The claim there was that beauty and the Good are “part of the same structure”187 such 
that seeing beauty, for example, in art, allows us to acquire the artist’s concept of the Good. 
Here I am not attempting to argue that seeing beauty constitutes seeing the Good, rather that the 
work of perceiving the Good is analogous to appreciating beauty, insofar as both require 
imagined synthesis in light of an understanding of the object (be it art-object or other person) as 
a cohesive whole.  
Further, contemplation of art-objects, and moral perception of other people both 
demand not only imagined synthesis, but also a detached respect for the object for its own sake. 
Murdoch defines a work of art as “a self-contained structure, which we set ourselves, in a certain 
mood of detachment and with a previous knowledge and acceptance of certain conventions, to 
consider as a whole,”188 and also characterises the art-object as “existing for its own sake”.189 The 
consideration of the art-object “as a whole” is intrinsically respectful, because it demands that we 
take a non-appropriative stance insofar as we do not attempt to change the art-object190 or 
“appropriate it into the greedy organism of the self”,191 rather understand that “it is for nothing, 
it is for itself”.192 For example, if we were to perceive a sculpture as a chair, and sit on it, we 
would “appropriate it” 193 to our own ends. Murdoch suggests that children can learn “respect”194 
from attending to art. She imagines what we might say to very young children having early 
experiences with art: “’Look, listen, isn’t that pretty, isn’t that nice?’ Also, ‘Don’t touch!’”195 She 
then goes on to conclude that this is “moral training as well as preparation for a pleasurable 
life.”196 Insofar as art demands respect if it is to be understood as art at all, aesthetic viewing 
necessitates detachment, and a selfless regard for the art-object for its own sake. 
To the extent that moral perception requires imagined synthesis and detachment, it is 
analogous with aesthetic perception. It might be the case that this observation has no practical 
import, given that it might not increase our instances of moral perception. Although I defend 																																																								
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that the two types of vision are analogous, I do not make any claim to their being identical. As 
such, in an attempt to perceive of another person morally, it would not assist to recommend that 
I perceive of them as if they were an artwork. Although relevantly similar insofar as they both 
demand imagined synthesis, and detachment, art-objects and people are nonetheless distinct. It is 
the case, however, that we do engage in imagined synthesis and detachment regularly, whenever 
we form an understanding of a work of art as art. It is also the case, as Murdoch attests, that 
instances of moral perception in life are rare.197 As such, if we want to understand what it is like 
to perceive of another morally, and what it requires, we can consider what it is like to appreciate 
a work of art, to respect it as art, and to view it in light of an understanding of its form. 
 
 III.2.2. Aesthetic and Moral Perception as Distinct: Attitude of Attention 
 
 As previously stated, I recognise that art-objects and humans are fundamentally distinct, 
such that aesthetic and moral vision are not interchangeable. We cannot necessarily achieve 
aesthetic perception of another person, so drawing an analogy between the two may not practically 
help us increase our instances of moral perception. However, it is nonetheless useful for 
theorising about what moral perception is like, and by for delineating the features of moral 
perception. For example, by exploring imagined synthesis and detachment in art, we can come to 
a better understanding of what Murdoch means when she insists that a loving gaze be both 
imaginative and detached. Further analysis of the extent to which the two modes of perception 
are distinct can also help us draw out a better understanding of the features of moral perception, 
in particular, the mode of attention required to perceive morally. I will first outline the requisite 
mode of attention, as identified by Christopher Cordner and Martha Nussbaum, and then 
discuss the extent to which art more easily occasions this kind of attention than other people. 
 Cordner suggests that Murdoch’s account of moral perception needs to be understood as 
more complex than a just and loving vision that is constituted exclusively in an accurate 
perception of reality. He argues that critics such as Julia Driver, Lawrence Blum and Bridget 
Clarke “shoehorn seeing D truly, lovingly, justly into more highly focused registering of 
details”.198 That is, he wants to suggest that perceiving reality unselfishly is not just a matter of 
appreciating the particulars of an individual or situation (a view he labels particularist)199 but also 
of our manner of attending. He distinguishes a just and loving gaze from attention to detail, 
suggesting that “There are various ways an orientation to details can manifest a looking that is 																																																								
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less than just and loving, without being linked to any such intention or wish”.200 He also 
distinguishes a loving gaze from the intensity of our scrutiny, arguing that looking closer does not 
always equate to looking more lovingly and justly:  
“If your way of looking is jealous or snobbish or sexist or racist, then your conceptual 
refinement will simply give you higher-resolution sexist or racist or snobbish ‘seeing.’ 
There is no reason at all to suppose that upping the degree of your conceptual 
refinement (or intensity of focus, or scrutiny) will itself lead you to ‘see truly.’”201 
Cordner thus establishes a need to characterise moral perception in terms other than close and 
intense attention to detail, and suggests a move away from particularist readings of Murdoch. 
 Cordner turns to Martha Nussbaum to articulate that which he perceives particularism as 
omitting. Nussbaum recounts her personal experience in conversation with Murdoch, and 
suggests that a just and loving gaze is not only constituted in the level of detail and information 
acquired by looking, but also in the onlookers reciprocal willingness to be seen. She writes: 
“I had no doubt… that Murdoch could have described me, after an hour, far more 
precisely than any lover of mine after some years…. But I think that there is something 
more to loving vision than just seeing. There is, for example, a willingness to permit 
oneself to be seen. There is also a willingness to stop seeing, to close one’s eyes before 
the loved one’s imperfections. There is also a willingness to be, for a time, an animal or 
even a plant, relinquishing the sharpness of creative alertness before the presence of a 
beloved body.”202 
Here Nussbaum draws our attention to moral perception as being seen as well as seeing: a 
willingness to showcase “aspects of vulnerability, silence and grace”.203 To return to Murdoch’s 
famous example of the mother-in-law, the suggestion here is that when she resolves to see the 
daughter-in-law in a different light, she is also opening herself up to the prospect of caring for 
the D, and in so doing exposing herself to D. Needless to say D is absent, so it is not a literal 
opening up to being seen, rather a vulnerability, such that if D were present, she could engage with 
M differently than she had previously. Moral vision on this account can be characterised, not just 
by the features of a just and loving gaze, but also by a willingness to be seen by others.  
Cordner uses Nussbaum’s anecdotal account of her experience with Murdoch to build 
up a more complex picture of what it means to perceive of another person morally. In a move 
away from particularism, he suggests that moral perception also requires serving, and waiting-on. 																																																								
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Serving is defined as “being present to another in a way that includes ‘letting oneself be seen or 
recognised’”,204 while waiting-on “help[s] give shape to Murdochian talk of attention as greater 
receptiveness to reality, and perhaps even as an increased sense of the reality of someone or 
something”.205 Here he again returns to the example of M and D, suggesting that M evidenced 
waiting-on, in her willingness to respond to D: “Her seeing of D is now more responsive to D, 
meaning that the reality of D now shapes her seeing of D to an extent it previously did not. The 
way she now sees D is thus more open—more exposed—to the reality of D, and that is precisely 
the form or mode of her vulnerability to D.”206 We can, therefore, understand moral perception 
as not only constituted in our mode of perceiving others, but also in our receptiveness to 
reciprocal perception by them.  
If we accept Cordner’s view that a just and loving gaze is constituted not only in the 
manner of seeing, but of being seen, then a clear distinction between the perception of art and of 
people arises. Aesthetic vision is fundamentally distinct from moral vision, insofar as you cannot 
be seen by an artwork. You can nonetheless expose yourself to an artwork, or display vulnerability, 
and indeed we do so every time we see an object as art. To observe an object as art is, as we have 
already noted, necessarily to imaginatively synthesise its parts into a cohesive whole, and to view 
the object with a selfless detachment. Perceiving an object as art requires respectfully recognising 
that it exists for its own sake, and in most cases, accepting that it has a meaning to convey. As 
such, viewing an object as art showcases a willingness to be moved by it, and to engage 
emotionally, in a way that we do not with an object that we are appropriating or using to our 
own ends. Displaying vulnerability in our relation with art is easy, arguably even required if we are 
to understand an object as art at all. When we think of what is required to perceive an object as 
art, and we observe that such a task necessitates imagined synthesis, detachment, and a kind of 
vulnerability that we do not display to non-artistic objects, we can come to understand aesthetic 
vision as constituted not only in how we perceive the work, but in the relationship between us and 
the work. Here aesthetic perception is far easier than moral perception, but it nonetheless assists 
us in building up our picture of moral perception as multifaceted, and concerning both ways of 
seeing and being seen.  
 Drawing on the analogies between aesthetic and moral perception allows us to develop a 
deeper understanding of the complexity of moral perception. In so doing, we can also come to 
accept the role of art as multifaceted; Murdoch advocates for art as not only a vehicle for moral 
perception, but also as an analogue. Where art may fail to live up to the ambitious task of actually 																																																								
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occasioning moral perception it can nonetheless help us build up a more complex conception of 
what moral perception is. In particular, analysing the similarities between aesthetic and moral 
vision brings us to a deeper understanding of not only the challenges of attaining moral 
perception, but also its complexity. The problem of form in art reveals moral perception to be 
obfuscated by an egoistic use of language, while the detachment, imagination and vulnerability 
required of aesthetic vision illuminate the same features in moral perception.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
If we can accept the conclusion drawn in Part III about the extent to which moral 
perception is analogous with aesthetic vision, what is the significance of this conclusion for our 
understanding of Murdoch, and of moral perception generally? 
The claim that art helps us actually achieve moral perception is arguably asking too much 
of art. Most interpretations of Murdoch have focussed on the rare instances where this is the 
case; where the artist attends to their subject with moral perception, and then renders it 
beautifully, and in so doing allows the artwork’s client to acquire their moral perception. Even if 
we can allow that under rare conditions of greatness this is the case, accepting a view of art as 
occasioning moral perception leaves Murdoch’s argument vulnerable to charges of elitism, unless 
we can provide a definition of great art that encompasses more than that which is Western and 
canonical.  
 However, I suggest that Murdoch’s discussion of the role of art in moral perception is 
not limited to its potential as a vehicle for moral perception. Its more accessible role is as an 
explanatory analogy. Given that moral perception (especially of other people) is extremely 
challenging to attain, it is likely that our experiences of it will be rare. As such, understanding 
moral perception is not just a matter of drawing on past experience. If we are to understand the 
concept at all, we need to look to experiences that are analogous if not identical, and that are 
more readily achievable than moral perception itself. This is the crucial role that art plays in 
Murdoch’s account of moral perception.  
It is important to stress that recognising this analogy is not essential to understanding 
moral perception. As Lita states, “Murdoch is not claiming that persons need a refined aesthetic 
taste in the usual sense in order to be moral. She is saying that within common morality there is 
to be seen or discerned a kind of vision or perception of others, which is best understood 
theoretically as an “aesthetic perception””.207 The claim here is not that those who have seen 
more art will necessarily be more moral. The observation is rather that if we were minded to 
work towards a better understanding both of Murdoch’s aesthetics and ethics, and moral 
perception generally, art could play a central role.  
Insofar as we can accept Murdoch’s account of moral perception, we can also accept that 
art has a crucial explanatory role to play. We cannot do justice to the complexity of Murdoch’s 
work without considering art as having not only a practical role in occasioning moral perception, 																																																								
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but also an explanatory role in deepening our understanding of it. I have argued that this latter 
role has been largely overlooked in favour of the weaker, comparatively limited claim about art’s 
potential to offer its client a practical experience of moral perception. As such, the explanatory 
role of art in moral perception merits further analysis in the pursuit of a more charitable reading 
of Murdoch’s aesthetics, and a more complex understanding of moral perception generally. 
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